Introduction
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Catholicism was a defi ning element of Irish national identity and the terms Catholic and Irish were virtually synonymous for three-quarters of the population. The identifi cation of faith and nationalist political identity, fi rst harnessed by Daniel O'Connell, strengthened during successive eff orts to end the Union and emerged triumphant in independent Ireland. Catholicism was also a core element of national identity in France, Spain and Italy but identifi cation alone did not prevent a steady decline in church allegiance in those countries. Ireland was diff erent because, aside from the absence of an anti-clerical left wing, the Catholic Church played a signifi cant role in the struggle for political independence and in the subsequent state-building project. Partition reinforced the association of political allegiance and religious affi liation on both sides of the border after 1920. In retrospect, the fi rst four decades of independent Ireland were an exceptional era. For the fi rst time in centuries, the Irish Catholic Church found itself without a rival institution or even 'a dialectical sparring partner' and it consequently enjoyed unprecedented infl uence and power. 1 Under the leadership of ultramontanist Cardinal Paul Cullen from 1852 until 1878, the Irish Catholic Church assumed a form that it maintained, remarkably, for over a century. 2 This was characterised by a strong allegiance to Rome ; a vast institutional presence through control of Catholic education, health and welfare homes; a disciplined clergy under episcopal control; and a thriving 'spiritual empire' abroad. The exceptional popular piety of twentieth-century Ireland sprang from Cullen's success in standardising
In an infl uential study David Miller has charted the eff orts of the Catholic Church to remain on terms with both the 'state' (the British government) and the 'nation' (the Catholic population) in the fi nal decades before independence. 7 In return for advancing its interests, the Church was prepared to bestow its legitimacy on state and nation alike. For all Christian churches no concern was more supreme than the sensitive area of education, control of which was perceived as essential if faith and values were to be transmitted to future generations. William Walsh, Archbishop of Dublin from 1885 to 1921 and the pre-eminent Irish prelate, played a pivotal role in securing equality of educational treatment for Catholics at all levels. His crowning achievement was the establishment of the National University of Ireland in 1908 which met Catholic concerns.
The Catholic Church was not neutral between state and nation, however. It backed nationalist aspirations in the belief that the nation would eventually supplant the British imperial state. This required considerable political dexterity and moral and theological ambiguity on the matter of rebellion. From the 1880s until 1916 a majority of the nation was represented by the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) which sought Home Rule. As Alvin Jackson has shown (see above Chapter 4 ), the spectre of a southern parliament helped to unify Ulster Protestants of various political shades whose political, religious and economic interests were intertwined with the Union itself. An informal but highly eff ective clerical-nationalist alliance, cultivated by Parnell, was disrupted by the IPP split. It re-emerged, however, when the party was reunited under Redmond in 1900. There were limits to the political infl uence of the Church just as there was a variety of political standpoints within the hierarchy and among the clergy. Church authority was accepted in matters deemed to be within the ecclesiastical domain such as education. But where politics was concerned the Church had little choice but to demonstrate that it was of and with the people. To do otherwise would alienate the laity -a lesson learned during the Land War (1879-1882). For this reason Archbishop Walsh was concerned for the plight of the workers during the 1913 Lockout, though he successfully opposed a scheme to send their children to England when it raised the spectre of proselytism. Ireland's small urban working class was not divorced from religious belief and practice in contrast to large segments of the same class in Europe. 8 This was the beginning of a rupture with the IPP as the Church adapted itself to an Irish political landscape profoundly altered by an inoperative Home Rule measure , disenchantment with the First World War and the aftermath of the 1916 Rising. The Catholic Church's traditional abjuration of violence, so evident in its largely ineff ective response to Fenianism in the 1860s, was moderated by caution in 1916. Strikingly, twenty-two of the 31 Catholic bishops and auxiliaries remained silent, including Archbishop Walsh . Bishops and clergy were sensitive to the transformation of public opinion occasioned by the ill-conceived government policy of executions, arrests and internment. The Church's alignment with majority nationalist opinion, embodied in the new nationalism of Sinn F é in, was demonstrated during the massive protest campaign against conscription in 1918 which the hierarchy declared was 'against the will of the Irish nation'. During the War of Independence clerical opposition focused on the violent methods employed but not on the goal of independence .
Catholicism Triumphant, 1920 Triumphant, -1960 After the founding of the Irish Free State the Catholic Church was more secure and more confi dent than at any previous time; it had little to fear from rival churches and enjoyed close links with the state. The situation was very diff erent in Northern Ireland. The 'traditional Catholicism' of twentiethcentury Ireland, which has attracted widespread comment, generally refers to the period before the 1960s when the Church's approach to the laity was authoritarian, prescriptive and dogmatic.
The Irish Free State A majority of Catholic Ireland supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty , which granted a signifi cant measure of self-government but not a republic and could not prevent civil war. The Catholic Church played an important role in securing popular legitimacy for the fl edgling Irish Free State. Prompted by the government, the hierarchy strongly condemned the anti-Treaty side in October 1922. The bishops expressed horror at the destruction and loss of life and maintained that 'no one is justifi ed in rebelling against the legitimate government . . . set up by the nation and acting within its rights'. 9 A sense of cultural identity constitutes a bonding power in most societies. In the aftermath of the confl ict, Catholicism and the reifi cation (if not active use) of the Irish language provided a sense of shared identity and cohesion clearly distinct from Protestant England. 10 This may explain why remarkably little hostility was shown to the Church even by republicans threatened with excommunication during the civil war. Parish missions 'served as instruments of reconciliation in communities that had been deeply divided' by the confl ict. 11 Similarly, the celebrations of the centenary of Catholic emancipation in June 1929 allowed the Free State to project 'an image of a country that was united, Irish, Catholic and free'.
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During the uncertainties of the 1920s, the Church off ered the new state continuity, stability and an extensive organisational infrastructure with over 13,000 clergy and religious. In return, a relatively penurious government allowed the Church to consolidate and extend its institutional presence in the realms of education, health and welfare with minimal interference -a pattern which persisted until the 1960s. This suited the state as religious labour was cheap or free and the capital costs were met by fundraising from the fl ock. The well-established nineteenth-century archetype of denominational pillarisation in these spheres continued as before and diff ered sharply from most European countries . After 1922 the Department of Education had limited power over the management of primary and secondary schools which remained vested in the Catholic and Protestant clergy. The state paid the salaries of teachers but its infl uence was largely restricted to control of the curriculum and an inspection system to ensure minimum teaching standards. 13 Church authorities fl exed 16 Antagonism initially characterised relations between Church authorities and the Northern Ireland administration, which was fond of depicting the Catholic population as disloyal. Two Catholic dioceses -Down and Connor and Dromore -are located entirely within Northern Ireland and four others (Armagh, Clogher, Derry and Kilmore) straddle the border. Their bishops opted out of the Education Act (Northern Ireland) 1923 , which introduced local authority involvement in the funding and management of schools, at the price of receiving significantly lower state funding. Finance and control of schools therefore posed a perennial dilemma for the bishops who deeply resented the inadequate fi nancial provisions for their voluntary schools, full control of which they zealously defended. After the Second World War the opportunities occasioned by the welfare state saw the northern Catholic bishops adopt a more pragmatic approach as they moved from highlighting the injustice of the state to injustices within in. There was never any question that the political border would compromise the religious unity of the Catholic Church whose map image remained an all-Ireland one .
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A Catholic Habitus The Irish Free State was not a theocracy but Catholicism was 'eff ectively transformed into a civil theology'.
18 That the political culture had a pronounced Catholic ethos was inevitable given the Catholic educational formation of a majority of successive generations of Irish elites in politics, business and public service, and the extraordinary level of religious homogeneity. The 1926 census revealed that Catholics comprised 93 per cent of the population; before partition they accounted for 73 per cent. As Tom Inglis has argued, a Catholic habitus -a way of thinking and acting in conformity with a systematic view of the world -permeated all social classes, and religious capital facilitated the acquisition of economic, political or social capital. 19 And so, during the fi rst fi fty years of independence both church and state leaders, irrespective of political party, shared a desire to develop the country according to a philosophy of Catholic nationalism. As a result, the coming to power of Fianna F á il under de Valera in 1932 was characterised by continuity in church-state relations, and 'their lordships took to Fianna F á il as prodigals who had fi nally given up their errant ways'. 20 The new government demonstrated its loyalty to Catholicism during the thirty-fi rst Eucharistic Congress, an international showpiece of global Catholicism, held in Dublin in June 1932. Unlike France or Italy, no anticlerical party emerged in Ireland and this refl ected the failure of left-wing politics to develop .
Until the 1960s there was an informal consensus between political and religious leaders. Although keen to avoid confrontation, ministers did not always submissively dispose as the bench of bishops proposed. For example, diplomatic relations were opened with the Vatican in 1929 despite the known opposition of the hierarchy. Similarly, the views of bishops who participated in the Banking Commission in 1938 and the Commission on Vocational Organisation in 1943 were dismissed by the state. There was a concern too for the constitutional rights of religious minorities. In 1931 the government rejected attempts to veto, on religious grounds, the appointment of Letitia Dunbar-Harrison , a Protestant and Trinity College graduate, as county librarian in Mayo. Much ink has been spilled over the 'mother and child' debacle in 1951 as a demonstration of government pusillanimity in the face of episcopal pressure. This was arguably less a church-state crisis than an internal government one. Firmer leadership on the same issue by Fianna F á il two years later negated the misgivings of the medical profession and clumsy episcopal impulses to embed certain Catholic principles in social legislation. 21 If anything the 'mother and child' controversy brought public scrutiny to bear on the role of the Church, which came to be increasingly questioned.
Signifi cant elements of the Catholic moral code were enshrined in law, particularly in the areas of sexual morality and family relations. Conservatism defi ned most aspects of Irish life between the 1920s and 1950s. For this reason the censorship of fi lms (1923) and publications (1929), the prohibition of divorce (1925) and a ban on the importation and sale of contraceptives (1935) were broadly favoured by all the Christian Churches. Pope Pius XI's encyclical Quadragesimo anno (1931 ) warned of the dangers of excessive state power and reinvigorated the Catholic social movement through its emphasis on solidarity and subsidiarity. It became a common theme in the pronouncements of the Irish bishops until the Second Vatican Council . The most important manifestation of the new Catholic social teaching in this period was Muintir na T í re (people of the countryside), a community development organisation founded by Father John Hayes in 1931, which played an important role in the emergence of the discipline of sociology in Ireland.
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There has been a tendency to overstate the infl uence of Catholic social teaching on de Valera's 1937 constitution. Recent legal scholarship has emphasised the extent to which the document in fact refl ected secular values such as respect for individual rights and separation of church and state . 23 Famously, article 44.2.1 recognised 'the special position' of the Catholic Church as the guardian of the faith professed by the great majority of citizens. Such recognition was common in Catholic countries. But 'apart from massaging episcopal amour proper ', the 1937 constitution did not establish the Catholic Church or 24 Instead it guaranteed not to endow any religion. The 'special position ' clause was deleted with minimum fuss in a constitutional referendum in 1972 under the shadow of the Northern Ireland Troubles.
Hothouse Catholicism
Between the 1920s and the 1950s the institutional Church was at its most dominant and devotional practices by a devout and deferential laity, in addition to weekly attendance at mass, were at their most visible and numerous. These activities included benediction, membership of confraternities and sodalities, pilgrimages, parish missions, processions, the rosary, stations, novenas, reading devotional literature (which was available in abundance), devotion to the Sacred Heart, the cult of the saints and their relics, and Marian devotion. Though well-established before independence with, for example, great Irish interest in Lourdes (which helped revive the Marian shrine of Knock in the 1930s), Marianism was particularly prevalent during the 1950s prompted by Pius XII 's proclamation of the Assumption in 1950 and the Marian year in 1954 to mark the centenary of the defi nition of the Immaculate Conception. James Donnelly argues that the upsurge in Marianism was a defensive strategy to combat changing social and sexual mores and anti-Christian forces. 25 Television displaced the family rosary and in the public realm Marian sodalities such as the Sodality of Our Lady , which in the 1940s boasted 250,000 members, went into sharp decline after the Second Vatican Council. 26 So too did the Legion of Mary , a lay Catholic organisation founded by Frank Duff in 1921 which focused on spiritual and social welfare (for example it addressed social problems such as homelessness and prostitution). In an Irish context it was a rare example of autonomous mobilisation by the faithful, for which Duff encountered opposition from the Dublin diocesan authorities. 27 Donnelly contends that some rosary enthusiasts redirected their energies towards the charismatic movement in the 1970s and towards the cult of Padre Pio in the 1980s. 28 The showing of a fi lm about Padre Pio to schoolchildren is believed to have inspired the fi rst incident of moving Marian statutes in the mid-1980s.
At an offi cial level the absence of civic ceremonial resulted in a reliance on Catholic ceremonial such as special masses for the opening of the D á il and other occasions. 29 Visitors to Ireland, both lay and clerical, marvelled at the extent to which Irish life was imbued with the language, symbols and rituals of Catholicism. But some, such as the American writer Paul Blanshard, criticised the cultural and social domination of the Catholic Church.
30 Despite legislative and moral protectionism, this period was a time of vigilance and fortress Catholicism. The menace of atheistic communism loomed large during the 1930s and became an all-consuming struggle during the papacy of Pius XII (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) . 31 At home, Saor É ire (a radical left-wing republican group) and a sister organisation, the Republican Congress , were condemned in 1931; while abroad there was great Irish interest in the Spanish Civil War , concern for the persecuted church in Hungary and Poland in the early years of the Cold War , and the collection by the hierarchy of £ 60,000 before the Italian general election in April 1948. 32 Sermons and pastorals warned relentlessly of a litany of corrupting infl uences which threatened Ireland's moral purity: proselytism, evil literature, indecent Hollywood movies, immodest dress, courting in public, excessive drinking, secularism, materialism, and 'leakage of the faith' among Irish emigrants (many of whom fell away from religious practice). Dancehalls, or more accurately the opportunities they aff orded for sexual immorality , were a clerical obsession. Patrick Kavanagh 's fi ctional character Tarry Flynn, poet and bachelor farmer, greatly admired the Catholic religion 'because it kept girls virtuous until such time as he'd meet them'. (and depicted by Irish writers from James Joyce to John McGahern ). The fear of losing eternal salvation, brilliantly evoked in Frank O'Connor 's short story First Confession , led to a high attendance at confession. 34 Before the 1970s there was little hierarchical concern for public ethics and morality. 35 Until the Second Vatican Council Irish Catholicism was 'characterised by a legalistic moral theology, a highly centralised, authoritarian institution and a sentimental spirituality'. 36 In spite of the hothouse climate, there were, as Louise Fuller notes, dissenting voices which found an outlet in two pioneering journals: the Furrow , founded in 1950, and Doctrine and Life , launched in 1951. When introducing Doctrine and Life , the Dominican provincial stated that its aim was to initiate people into a deeper understanding of their faith which 'never became for them a personal conviction'. 38 Both journals communicated the ideas of European theologians and Catholic intellectual thought to Irish readers. This ensured that Catholic Ireland was not completely unprepared for the new thinking and renewal of the Second Vatican Council. Throughout the 1950s contributors warned repeatedly that Irish Catholicism was less secure than it appeared in the face of the rising tide of secularism. In 1959 one priest cautioned that an increasingly middle class Ireland was 'trying to make do with a peasant religion . . . and we must have a religion to fi t our needs '. 39 This observation underscored the bizarre absence of theology in Ireland, a country which lacked a critical Catholic philosophical tradition in public discourse and produced not a single Catholic philosopher of European stature in the modern era. The prohibition of a theology faculty was a condition of the hierarchy's support for the establishment of the National University of Ireland in 1908. Perhaps ironically Trinity College became the fi rst university to introduce a theology degree for non-divinity students in 1979. Only in the twenty-fi rst century did religious studies become a subject on the secondary school curriculum. As one commentator put it, 'Ireland must be the only country in the world where lay Catholics were eff ectively excluded for a century from the option of achieving theological literacy.' 40 Irish Catholicism in Transition, 1960 Transition, -c .1990 Modernisation was the zeitgeist of the 1960s and a changing economic, political and social landscape gradually dissolved the protectionist walls that surrounded Irish Catholicism. A variety of factors combined to transform Irish society and the place of religion within it. From the premiership of Se á n Lemass onwards, political elites were no longer so deferential and the state prioritised economic growth over the simpler Catholic nationalist vision of Irish society that had prevailed since independence. Another major instrument of modernisation was the establishment of a national television service in December 1961. The expansion of the market and the media in subsequent decades 'ushered in a new habitus that was based on liberal-individualism, materialism and consumerism, the very things against which the Church had preached so vehemently for generations'. 41 The shift from a culture of selfdenial to one of self-indulgence was spectacularly evident during the Celtic Tiger era. It was belatedly recognised in the 1960s that the extension of educational opportunity was a central aspect of national economic development. This had profound consequences for a people used to unquestioning belief in their clergy. Yet another important stimulus of modernisation was the women's movement. The Second Vatican Council (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) and its aftermath revealed a sclerotic church institution in Ireland and a hierarchy more comfortable preserving rather than renewing its magisterium. To compound matters vocations went into inexorable decline from the late 1960s.
Television
As Robert Savage notes (see Chapter 19 , this volume), Ireland was one of the last countries in Western Europe to gain an indigenous television service. There was great anxiety at the challenge this posed to the Church's authority as well as the potential moral dangers of foreign programming. 42 The Catholic hierarchy had been slow to utilise the potential of the radio. High Mass on Sundays was not broadcast on a regular basis until 1948 and the daily broadcast of the Angelus was not inaugurated until 1950; both were at the prompting of John Charles McQuaid , the formidable Archbishop of Dublin from 1940 to 1972, who appointed a priest as his own liaison with Radio É ireann . 43 The hierarchy did not enjoy the same degree of informal infl uence after the implementation of the Broadcasting Authority Act (1960) which established the new television service and removed broadcasting from direct government control. The speed and force of television's impact on Irish society far exceeded that of the cinema and the radio. With the relaxation of the laws on censorship, programmes such as the Late Late Show , an amalgam of American talk-show, light entertainment and current aff airs, facilitated the questioning of traditional structures of authority that over time reduced the infl uence of and deference towards priests, bishops and even popes. by appointing a succession of dynamic and assertive ministers: Patrick Hillery, George Colley, Donagh O'Malley . The most singular advance was the introduction of free post-primary education from the 1967 school year. Ironically, just as the number of school children began to increase, the number of vocations began to decline. John Walsh has revised the cordial characterisation of church-state interaction in this period put forward by earlier studies by revealing the 'profound suspicion and hostility with which Catholic bishops and managerial authorities greeted far-reaching educational reform' which undermined their hegemonic control. 46 Although the denominational character of schools remained unaltered, a new balance of power in education had been achieved in which the enhanced infl uence of the state in education was accepted with varying degrees of reluctance. 47 The replacement of one-and two-teacher schools with larger central schools, as recommended by Investment , illustrated the new reality. A public clash between Colley and Bishop Browne of Galway did not deter the Department of Education and by 1973, 1,100 small schools had closed. In Northern Ireland the 1968 Educational Act proposed grants of 80 per cent and public representatives on school management committees. Overwhelming supported by the Catholic laity, the fi nancial imperative compelled the Catholic bishops to accept a position they had resisted since 1923. There was also a growing interest in integrated education in Northern Ireland, something which notably predated the Troubles.
The Women's Movement The changing position of women was crucial in modernising Ireland, particularly from the 1970s onwards. Irish women challenged the patriarchal nature of Irish society and traditional church teaching on birth control and on the natural role of woman as mother and home-maker. Several commentators have noted that the Irish mother played a vital role in the development and transmission of Irish Catholicism from generation to generation, and in maintaining the prestige in which the clergy were held. Once women were able to access alternative sources of power through the workplace and public life, a central pillar of the Church's ideological control was removed. 48 The introduction of various equality directives following Irish entry to the The Second Vatican Council and its Implications The Second Vatican Council generated an expectation of change in the religious sphere which was ultimately unfulfi lled. In his opening address John XXIII sought agg iornamento , the bringing of the Church up to date through the inner renewal of the Church, the unity of Christians, and the opening of the Church to the contemporary world. The proceedings between October 1962 and December 1965 were extensively reported by the world media. Catholic Ireland greeted the key deliberations -on the nature of the Church as the people of God, the collegiality of the bishops and lay participation in the mission of the Church -with optimism. By the council's conclusion, four constitutions, nine decrees and three declarations had scrutinised every aspect of Church life and transformed the Catholic Church. While the fundamentals of faith remained immutable, their adaptation to, and presentation in, the modern world did not. The Irish bishops were not in the van of agg iornamento and took a very limited part in the council ses- reverse of exuberant'. 49 The Irish hierarchy was wary of change lest it undermine their magisterium or endanger the faith and morals of the laity. This was refl ected in episcopal pronouncements following the conclusion of the council. Bishop William Philbin of Down and Connor warned against any suggestion that the Church could be 'cut adrift from its moorings by the Vatican Council' and McQuaid reassured a congregation that 'no change will worry the tranquillity of your Christian lives'.
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The alterations to liturgy, church governance, theology, and ecumenism led to fractious division along progressive/ traditional lines in North America and Europe but not in theologically impoverished Ireland, where the local implementation was legalistic, begrudging and narrow. Vincent Twomey puts it more strongly: 'unthinking to the end, a provincial and submissive Church simply and obediently carried out the instructions coming from Rome that unintentionally but eff ectively dismantled their own, deeply cherished version of Catholicism'. 51 The use of the vernacular in the Mass was introduced on 7 March 1965 and sanctuaries were reordered to face the con- Misconceptions of a religious war in Northern Ireland provided the most pressing rationale for ecumenical entente at the end of the 1960s. Eric Gallagher and Stanley Worrall make the interesting assertion that had the Troubles occurred ten years earlier, the Churches would have taken sides as they did during the Home Rule crisis. 54 The Troubles forced Church leaders to question whether they were prisoners of the cultural and political polarities of Irish life, and in part responsible for the anguish in Northern Ireland. This resulted in the fi rst offi cial inter-Church meeting at Ballymascanlon , County Louth in September 1973. The tendency in media circles to evaluate the progress of ecumenical dialogue in terms of the resolution of the Northern Ireland problem did a great disservice to both. Eric Gallagher captured the paradox of ecumenical advance against the background of the Troubles: 'the leaders of our Churches are probably -even certainly -having more contacts . . . than ever before. And at the same time the rank and fi le never had less and they never wanted less'. 55 Political violence posed particular diffi culties for the Catholic Church. As Oliver Raff erty has observed, it was 'locked in a herculean struggle' with the Republican movement 'over the symbols and identity of northern Catholic life.' 56 Its sustained condemnation of violence had little impact and its actions were often misunderstood by the government resulting in a weak ability to infl uence the political agenda. Ganiel and Dixon suggest that over the course of the Troubles religion was, socially and politically, more important for Protestants than for Catholics. 57 In 1986 Se á n Freyne, theologian and biblical scholar, suggested that the Second Vatican Council had 'made almost no impact on Irish Catholicism apart from a few cosmetic changes to the liturgy . . . because the questions the Council sought to grapple with had never been seriously posed in this country ' . 58 This focuses attention on the quality of episcopal leadership. Oliver Raff erty suggests that in recent years 'it has become something of a fashion among retired bishops to lament that Vatican II was not fully implemented in Ireland. But who was responsible for its implementation if not these same prelates?' 59 The Vatican system of appointment of bishops with little input by the local church has attracted criticism given the tendency to select 'the "safe" man and the orthodox mentality, for which the Church is paying in Peter's Pence today'. 60 Other appointees have had very limited pastoral experience; many others had, as one historian puts it, 'excellent negative minds'. 61 Although religious orders have changed the way in which they exercise leadership and authority since Vatican II, this was not replicated in the institutional Catholic Church. During the long pontifi cate of John Paul II there was a 'disheartening return to an ethos of control and infallibility' as the legacy of the council was 'dismantled bit by bit, with signifi cant teachings modifi ed out of existence by a thousand qualifi cations'. 62 This approach to Church governance was demonstrated in 2011 when a new translation of the missal was introduced by the Vatican with little prior consultation with priests or people, many of whom protested at the stilted language used. Cullen's 'episcopal imperialism ' was complemented by his recognition of the need to ensure that lay emigrants were as 'assiduous in the practice of their faith as those who remained'. 64 Mass migration from Ireland involved all denominations and the nineteenth-century missionary movement was therefore not confi ned to Catholic missionaries. Unlike Irish Catholics who, as Donald Akenson remarks of New Zealand, 'simply refused to go away', Irish Protestants had largely vanished as a category of self-identifi cation by the mid-twentieth century if not before. 65 The half century to 1960 was 'the golden age of Irish missions'. 66 From the 1920s the number of Irish Catholic clerical and religious missionaries increased steadily until the 1970s when they plateaued at about 6,000 spread across Africa, Asia and Latin-America -the largest contribution per capita of any country. 67 In 2014 there were 1,600 Irish missionaries. 68 Missionary activity laid the basis for concern with the developing world from the 1960s. It paved the way for NGOs such as Concern , established in 1968; Tr ó caire , the Irish Catholic Church's offi cial overseas development agency founded in 1973 (with its distinctive Lenten collection boxes); and Goal established in 1977. 'The missionaries' work and that of the aid agencies that followed in their footsteps, became an extension of Irish values of Christianity, justice and peace, and their expression on the world stage .' 69 Falling Vocations Remarkably, according to the 1961 census there were more religious (the vast majority being Catholic) in Ireland (15,323) than civil servants (14,695). 70 For the fi rst time in the twentieth century a decline in the total number of priests, brothers and nuns was recorded in 1968. 71 Since then the power of the Church has waned due to the drying up of vocations. Without the human resources to staff the myriad of hospitals, welfare homes and schools the Church's institutional presence inevitably contracted. Depleted ranks, increased running costs, greater state involvement, professionalisation of services, new management structures and a post Vatican II reassessment of their mission prompted a withdrawal of religious. For example, the ratio of religious to lay teachers dropped from 18.9 per cent of trained primary school teachers in 1965-1966 to 4.6 per cent in 1992. 72 In September 2014 only ten religious, half of them women, served as principals of post primary schools compared to 104 in 1991. 73 The day-to-day input into the religious ethos of schools has all but disappeared. The move away from the traditional ministries of education and healthcare towards pastoral and social ministries was facilitated by a post-Vatican II change in the mode of community life as smaller groupings of three to fi ve religious replaced the traditional practice of living in large convents and monasteries.
This transformation did not arrest the slide in vocations, however. Between 1966 and 2006 vocations to all forms of religious life fell from 1,409 to 53, a decline of 96 per cent. This was most acute among religious orders, some of which are destined to disappear. The number of vocations to brothers' orders fell from 173 to 1, to clerical religious orders from 390 to 15 and to sisters' orders from 592 to 9. 74 In 1967 there were 29,984 religious in Ireland, the majority women. By 2000 the total was 16,046 (10,987 sisters, 4,134 clerical religious and 925 brothers) with just 24 male and 21 female new entrants. 75 The decline in the number of female vocations was a sharp reversal of the gender balance of earlier decades. Although there was a similar drop in numbers of religious in other western European countries, fi n-desi è cle Ireland still had a signifi cantly higher proportion of religious per head of the general population of 0.38 per cent; the corresponding fi gure for Italy was 0.205, Belgium 0.190 and Spain 0.171. 76 However, just over two-thirds of Irish religious were aged 60 or over. It is hardly surprising then that in 2015 the number of religious had declined further to 8,279 (6,282 sisters, 1,412 clerical priests and 585 brothers). 77 The magnitude of the post-Vatican II decline in vocations to religious orders was not unique to Ireland. There was a similarly rapid decline in North America and Western Europe. For instance, between 1965 and 1995 female religious in France declined by 44 per cent and male religious by 68 per cent; the respective fi gures in Britain were 43 per cent and 82 per cent. 78 The contraction in the number of diocesan clergy in Ireland was not as drastic or as swift as in other Catholic countries. In France the number of ordinations fell from 646 in 1965 to 99 in 1977, whereas in Ireland the respective decline was from 282 to 141. 79 However, by the late 1990s, as for religious orders, falling ordinations had reached crisis point with deaths, withdrawals and retirements far outstripping new entrants. Between 1966 and 2006 the number of diocesan vocations fell from 254 to 28, a decline of 89 per cent. 80 In 2012 there were just 12 vocations, the lowest number on record. This recovered modestly in 2015 when 17 seminarians began their training for Ireland's twenty-six dioceses. 81 During the 1990s seminaries in Dublin, Thurles, Kilkenny, Waterford and Carlow closed; only the national seminary in Maynooth remains. At a parish level, an aging and declining cohort of priests have increasing demands on their time and energy. In 2015 there were 1,966 active priests assigned to parish ministry, a fall of 1,010 since 2000 and almost half the 1961 total of 3,702. 82 The average age of an Irish priest in 2015 was 64. The future looks bleak. By 2020 the Dublin archdiocese will, by its own estimate, barely have one priest for each of its 199 parishes. 83 In many dioceses parishes are now clustered. Greater lay ministry will be required to sustain the Church into the future when there may no ordained minister to conduct services. It makes more glaring Dermot Lane 's observation that the most serious defi ciency in the decades since the Vatican Council was the failure to activate the priesthood of the laity as outlined in conciliar documents and more recent ones such as the Vocation and Mission of the Laity (1988) . 84 Declining Levels of Orthodox Religious Belief Even in the early 1960s, survey evidence revealed an incipient but unmistakeable change of religious outlook . Bruce Biever, an American Jesuit, conducted an elaborate survey of Catholic attitudes towards religion and clerical authority in Dublin in 1962. This captured the prominent role of religion and the clergy in everyday life but signposted a more challenging future for the Church. Although 88 per cent of the sample agreed that the Church was the greatest force for good in Ireland, a striking 83 per cent of those who had completed secondary education disagreed with this proposition. 85 Biever suggested that the Irish priest faced a dilemma . An emerging educated class, as yet unrepresentative of the general population, demanded more sophisticated answers to modern-day problems than the platitudes that had satisfi ed their parents. But at the same time, he was confronted by the 'suspicious gaze' of the many people in rural areas 'who were hostile to change in whatever form'. 86 Change was not confi ned to Dublin, however. The Limerick Rural Survey , a pioneering sociological investigation commissioned by Muintir na T í re , revealed higher personal expectations driven by the economic growth of the 1960s, the attractions of urban life and a more individualistic pursuit of fulfi lment. 87 In a climate of rapid social and cultural change the extension of secondary education produced a population no longer willing to accept dictation on issues considered matters of individual conscience. This was evident in the Irish response to Humanae Vitae , Pope Paul VI 's contested encyclical in 1968, which reaffi rmed traditional Church opposition to artifi cial means of birth control. Internationally, many Catholic theologians dissented publicly from its teaching. This occasioned a crisis of authority for the global Church. Unlike episcopal conferences in other countries, the Irish hierarchy did not issue pastoral guidelines which would have given priests some fl exibility in the confessional where many committed Catholics were torn between allegiance to Church teaching and marital or health responsibilities to control fertility. Many came to regard artifi cial contraception, no longer a taboo subject, as morally acceptable. But clerical dissent was not entertained. In Cork Father James Good was suspended from priestly duties for describing the encyclical as a 'major tragedy' that would be rejected by Catholic lay people.
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The hierarchy misjudged the public reaction which questioned the authority of the bishops to pronounce on such a subject. Much institutional credibility was lost twenty years before the sexual scandals of the 1990s.
The quietly shifting sands of Catholic Ireland were exposed during the 1970s. 90 But numbers at Mass were not an accurate index to the spiritual health of a Church and the Irish survey disclosed a signifi cant disparity between High Mass attendance and a rate of weekly communion of just 28 per cent. This suggested that for some Sunday observance was a matter of social conformism or convention rather than conviction. Furthermore, the young were losing interest: 30 per cent in the 21 to 25 age category and 25 per cent of young single men and women in the 18 to 30 age bracket had abandoned the minimal obligations of weekly mass and annual sacraments. The survey forecast that many parents of the next generation would not return to religious practice with marriage and middle age. 91 The analysis of attitudes was even more disconcerting. The survey revealed a serious absence of internalised faith notwithstanding impressive church attendance and concluded that the beliefs and practices of the majority of Catholics are insuffi ciently interiorised . . . not personally examined and tested and then affi rmed or rejected. Irish religious practice is sustained to an inadmissible extent by rule and law, social custom and a sense of duty, a framework of authority and sanction rather than by a personal commitment of mind and heart so that such belief or faith is extremely vulnerable in a rapidly changing society. A survey by M í che á l Mac Gr é il, SJ , of adults in Dublin in 1977 confi rmed the growing gulf between the orthodox teaching of the Vatican and the beliefs of the faithful in respect of artifi cial contraception (63 per cent disagreed that it was always wrong), celibacy (46 per cent agreed that priests should be allowed to marry), the role of women in the church and homosexuality (43 per cent agreed that it should be decriminalised). 94 Another study found that barely more than half fully accepted belief in the devil and hell, a sign that the habitual fear of eternal damnation was waning. 95 In important aspects of Church teaching the orthodox view had become a minority one. All of the many survey fi ndings indicated that the higher the levels of urbanisation and educational attainment, the lower the level of orthodox religious belief, acceptance of church teaching and attendance at confession.
Against this background, the three-day papal visit in 1979 was less a celebration of Catholic Ireland than an unsuccessful attempt to slow down the inroads made by materialism and secularism. In one of the great public events in the modern history of Irish Catholicism, an estimated 2.7 million people greeted Pope John Paul II in Dublin , Drogheda , Galway and Limerick. Almost one-third of the population gathered to hear the pontiff celebrate mass in the Phoenix Park , Dublin on 29 September in an event that dwarfed the 1932 Eucharistic Congress. Nearly a quarter of a million young people greeted the Pope in Galway and heard him warn that 'the religious and moral traditions of Ireland, the very soul of Ireland, will be challenged by temptations that spare no society in our age' before famously declaring: 'Young people of Ireland, I love you. ' Likewise, in Limerick he challenged his audience to choose between 'giving excessive importance to economic growth and material possessions' or fi delity to 'the things of the spirit'. 96 The size of the crowds, the charisma of the pontiff , and the general excitement generated by the visit could not disguise the fact that secularisation may have been belated in Ireland but it was gathering pace.
The papal visit took place just two months after the passage of the Family Planning Act. For much of the twentieth century Ireland was unique among Western countries in not permitting abortion, contraception or divorce. The hierarchy held the traditional line on these issues, but for the fi rst time in November 1973 openly acknowledged that the state should not be the guardian of private morality: ' There are many things which the Catholic Church holds to be morally wrong and no one has ever suggested, least of all the Church herself, that they should be prohibited by the State. ' 97 In Britain and America change in this sphere occurred over a century but in Ireland this was telescoped into a much shorter time span. Seven bruising 'moral issue' constitutional referenda on abortion and marriage were held between 1983 and 2002. They were preceded by the legalisation of contraception in 1979, as a result of a Supreme Court ruling in the McGee case, with further extensions in 1985 and 1992. The insertion of an ambiguously worded pro-life amendment in 1983 was carried by a two to one majority in a poll of only 54 per cent. In the wake of the 'X' case which permitted the risk of suicide by the mother as grounds for abortion, three concurrent referenda in 1992 affi rmed freedoms of travel and information about abortion services but not the risk of suicide as grounds to allow an abortion. The latter position was reaffi rmed in a further referendum in 2002. Garret FitzGerald recalled that concerns about property rights and pressure from the pulpit led 63 per cent to reject divorce in 1986.
98 But a signifi cant minority dissented from Church teaching and nine years later divorce was narrowly approved. The so-called liberal agenda pursued during this tumultuous period was a refl ection rather than a cause of change. As Nic Ghiolla Ph á draig has noted, accompanying these campaigns was 'a growing coolness between the government and the hierarchy' and little prior Church-state consultation, something unimaginable in earlier decades. 99 Irish Catholicism in Crisis, 1990s to the Present Since the 1990s the religious landscape in Ireland has changed dramatically. While there is little evidence of out and out secularisation, Irish religiosity has changed signifi cantly. Traditionally the sociology of religion has been dominated by the debate around secularisation -the 'process by which religious institutions, actions and consciousness lose their social signifi cance'.
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The secularisation thesis claims that the diminishing importance of religion in social and individual life is a consequence of an inherent tension between modernity and religion. Diff erences in the degree of secularisation between generations have been linked to changes brought about by increased levels of education or less compared to 34.1 with third-level education). For all that, the rate of weekly Mass attendance in Ireland in 2008 was higher than other areas surveyed: Northern Ireland came a close second at just over 40 per cent while the rate in Spain was 18.6 per cent. 108 However, the age profi le of formal religious practice suggests that decline is gathering pace. One of the most striking fi ndings was that that confession was 'dying out', a further indication of the erosion of the Church's ideological power. According to Mac Gr é il, one-third of Catholics never go to confession , only 28 per cent go 'several times a year', and just under half of 18-to 40-year-olds have given up going altogether. 113 Those with no religion or atheist or agnostic had higher levels of education than the general population and were concentrated in Dublin. In the present century there has been a visible increase in mind-body publishing, adherence to alternative spiritualties and New Age practices, as well as growing syncretism.
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According to Heelas and Woodhead, this represents a movement away from 'the institutionally and doctrinally-focused religiosity of recent centuries and towards a looser and more inner-directed spirituality, less easily measured by organisational affi liation or assent to particular principles'. 121 The largest and most widespread group is the Redeemed Christian Church of God which in 2012 had 118 parishes of various sizes in the Republic and had, with the exception of Roscommon , at least one parish in each county. 122 Nonetheless, according to the leading scholar of African Pentecostal churches in Ireland, it is 'diffi cult to foresee the eventual transformation of the ghettoised universal of 129 Italy off ers a pertinent example of a shift from a monopolistic Catholic religious culture to an unprecedented level of religious pluralism. 130 The Italians no longer subscribe en masse to the institutional Church but retain 'a generic sense of affi liation'. 131 The arrival over several decades of large numbers of immigrants transformed Italy's religious geography. Religions other than Catholicism account for 3.5 per cent of the population. This includes historically established communities such as Jews and the Protestant churches as well as the religions of immigrants. Islam has outstripped all other non-Catholic religious groups to become Italy's second religion . 132 Ireland presents a similar pattern of uneven but concurrent secularisation and new forms of religiosity. Sociological and ethnographic research on new religions in Ireland is yet in its infancy, let alone the study of the development of a second generation of Irish citizens of Islamic, Orthodox, Pentecostal faiths. 133 A recent study suggests that Ireland has become post-Catholic in the sense of moving beyond 'the once-dominant monopoly of the institutional Catholic Church to a mixed religious market' with a variety of contending types of Christianity and other religions. 134 The changing religious landscape has contributed to a growing demand by parents and the state for a school system better aligned with the needs of a now culturally and religiously diverse population and a plurality of models of provision. 135 The Irish primary school system is quite unusual in the Anglophone world with 96 per cent of schools under denominational control. Some 2,841 (89.65 per cent) of the approximately 3,169 primary schools are under the patronage, management and ownership of the Catholic Church; in addition, about half of post-primary schools are under denominational control. 136 There were, in addition, 174 Church of Ireland schools, 17 Presbyterian , 1 Methodist , 1 Jewish , 1 Quaker and 2 Islamic schools . In future there will be a wider choice of school types and less religious patronage. To this end a Forum on Patronage and Pluralism in the Primary Sector reported in 2012 and policies to implement its recommendations are being devised . 137 Thinning Pews A number of reasons for an increasing detachment from the institutional Church can be advanced. Atypically high participation rates may simply be converging with other European and Western countries, many of which went through periods of declining churchly religion. For example, Callum Brown has documented how abruptly Britain became more secular in the early 1960s. 138 Unquestionably, the number with a genuine faith commitment has shrunk. Commentators have pointed to the failure to evangelise a new generation as 'the great drama of contemporary Irish Catholicism'. 139 Understanding of the basic tenets of Catholicism has become so poor that even in seminary training a propaedeutic year -an introductory year before formal studies begin -is being introduced because of the impoverished levels of faith development. 140 Second, the church in contemporary Ireland has little infl uence over public opinion, the state and the media. Indeed the latter has become the chief supplier of alternative value systems and new forms of conformity. The media has also provided an intense critique of religious institutions which were once above public scrutiny. Indeed some commentators have identifi ed a form of 'secular fundamentalism' in the Irish media. Marie Keenan has noted that in Ireland the coverage of clerical sexual abuse led to the emergence of a new and powerful media template: Brendan Smyth (a Norbertine order priest sentenced to twelve years imprisonment) and the paedophile priest. 142 The dangers of false allegations and trial by media (sometimes without basic fact-checking) were exposed when RT É 's 'Mission to Prey' (2011) defamed an innocent Catholic priest in what the director-general of RT É admitted was one of the gravest editorial mistakes ever made by the broadcaster. The Irish Church has yet to develop a coherent media strategy. Third, adherence to Church teaching on social and moral matters such as abortion, pre-martial sexual relations and same-sex relations have sharply declined. The percentage of non-marital births grew from 4 per cent in 1977 to 31.4 in 2005; the number of divorced Catholics in 2011 was 64,798, a rate of 3.6 per cent (the rate for the general population was 4.2 per cent). 143 Most 746 spectacularly, in May 2015 a referendum on same-sex marriage was approved by 62 per cent . How people live out their Catholic identity has become, as Anderson and Lavan contend, an individual matter that consists of believing in Church teachings regarding beliefs but not obeying Church rules on how to practice this faith . 144 Fourth, for an increasing number, Catholicism is part of a socio-cultural identity expressed at key rites of passage such as baptism, marriage and last rites. In 1999-2000, the EVS found that over 90 per cent of the Irish population thought such religious ceremonies important. Even among the non-affi liated in other countries, there was an emphasis on a religious ceremony particularly at death. 145 It may become increasingly diffi cult to measure the extent to which church membership becomes merely nominal and religious practice a matter of social convention or cultural ritual. Lastly, the clerical sex abuse scandals and the Church's inadequate response have been intensely corrosive.
Scandal
Since the early 1990s the Catholic Church in Ireland has been besieged by scandals too numerous to itemise. The fi rst wave of sexual scandal involved paternity cases. In 1992 Catholic Ireland was shocked to discover that É amonn Casey, Bishop of Galway, had secretly fathered a child with an American woman, Annie Murphy, in the 1970s and used Church funds to support her. Shortly afterwards it emerged that Fr Michael Cleary, a media fi gure wellknown for his defence of traditional Catholic values, had fathered two children with his housekeeper, Phyllis Hamilton. Both Casey and Cleary had introduced the pope in Galway in 1979 . For an institution so preoccupied with questions of sexual morality the consequent loss of standing was swift. By 1999 among the Catholic European countries examined in the EVS, Ireland had on average the lowest level of trust in the Church . 146 Far more destructive and larger in scale due to the extensive involvement of the Church in welfare provision, as outlined by Catherine Cox (see Chapter 23 this volume), was the emotional, physical and sexual abuse of vulnerable children by a minority at least until the mid-1990s, were the maintenance of secrecy, the avoidance of scandal, the protection of the reputation of the Church and the preservation of its assets. All other considerations, including the welfare of children and justice for victims, were subordinated to these priorities. The archdiocese did not implement its own Canon Law rules and did its best to avoid any application of the law of the State. 147 This echoed the fi ndings of similar investigations in the archdiocese of Boston.
The betrayal of trust has undermined the credibility and moral authority of the institutional Church in Ireland and globally. The scale of clerical abuse may have appeared greater because decades of crimes were investigated in a relatively short period of time. The institutional Church does not stand indicted alone. The Irish state and society were complicit by their failure to safeguard the marginalised in the industrial school and Magdalene asylum. As in the US, the Irish Church responded by fi rst developing child protection guidelines in 1996. This was followed fi ve years later by the establishment of a child protection offi ce (now the National Board for Safeguarding Children in the Catholic Church in Ireland) and a pastoral directive on clerical child abuse in 2011 called Towards Healing and Renewal . The commissioning of an independent study Time to Listen: Confronting Child Sexual Abuse by Catholic Clergy in Ireland (2003) to understand the impacts of and responses to clerical child sex abuse was the fi rst of its kind in the global Church. 148 The scandals have overshadowed the invaluable work of priests, religious and Catholic voluntary organisations such as the Society of St Vincent de Paul (which in 2014 had 10,500 members) to ameliorate economic hardship and social inequality. 149 However, over the longer term the scandals were 'just the fi nal act in a long play of structural transformation' which has denuded the power and infl uence of the Church . 150 
Conclusion
The Catholic Church in Ireland is in the maelstrom of its gravest crisis in centuries. As an institution, it labours under the challenge of coping with the past and salvaging its precarious position to fi nd a relevant role in contemporary Ireland. Catholicism is no longer an integral part of Irish identity in a society that has become increasingly heterogeneous, secular, ethnically diverse and religiously indiff erent. Greatly diminished not just in membership but in authority and infl uence, the Irish Catholic Church could experience extreme contraction, as has occurred in France. Yet, despite Catholicism's many travails, there is still a signifi cant critical mass of believers in Ireland. This holds the promise (and historians make at best unreliable prophets) of continued vigour within a more pluralist environment. In 1994 Grace Davie, a sociologist, advanced the concept of 'believing without belonging' which has been widely cited ever since. 151 More recently she updated this model and prefers the concept of 'vicarious religion' where an active minority maintains the faith for the occasional use of the many. 152 The resilience and size of that active minority in an Irish Catholic context depends on eff ective Church leadership which must do more than simply manage decline. It must ensure institutional reform, a real sharing of authority at all levels, a new evangelism, an energetic theological culture, adaptation to the spiritual demands of the present age and, above all, a rediscovery of its core Christian mission.
